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ABSTRACT 
Because the Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) nodes are low-cost devices, attackers may capture some nodes in this network and 
then duplicate these nodes to eavesdrop the transmitted messages or even control the network gradually without difficulty. This 
is the so-called node replication attack. This type of attacks could cause the huge threat to information security of WSNs. 
Therefore, in this paper, we would like to suggest a detection approach which can offer good performance but with higher energy 
consumption. Hence, it can provide an alternative solution for some specific applications that need better precision but do not 
care energy or lifespan too much. 
 
Keywords:  Mobile Wireless Sensor Network, Network Security, Node Replication Attack Detection, LEACH-ME Routing 
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INTRODUCTION 
The WSN is composed of many wireless sensor nodes. This kind of network is often used in various scenarios such as battlefield, 
animal detection, sea water temperature collection, etc. Wireless sensor nodes could be self-configuring and self-maintaining 
with mobility or not. Furthermore, WSN nodes are often made with low-cost and less-security consideration because the 
deployment of WSN may need thousands of sensor nodes or more most of the time. For some particular applications, sensor 
nodes are also deployed in the huge open space so it may be very difficult in general to guarantee the safety of each node. These 
situations results in various kinds of threats to the secure operation of WSN. 
 
Due to the characteristics of WSN, it may suffer from many kinds of attacks such as sinkhole attack, Sybil attack, wormhole 
attack, node replication attack and so on (Padmavathi & Shanmugapriya, 2009; Wang et al., 2006). Even though most of threats 
and attacks can be effectively prevented by using cryptographic algorithms; however, they are not suitable for WSNs due to the 
lightweight design of sensor nodes. In this paper, we would like to focus on node replication attack and provide a solution. As for 
node replication attack, the malicious attackers can capture one sensor node and then duplicate this node with many copies easily. 
These nodes can be deployed within the huge WSN and finally eavesdrop important messages transmitted in the network. 
Therefore, how to detect the node replication attack becomes one of the most important issues for information security of WSNs. 
Considering the potential damage caused by node replication attack, the suitable detection methods are really necessary for the 
future development of applications of WSN. There are lots of replication node detection approaches that had been proposed in 
the past. However they may only function well in different environments. Some methods work better for static nodes and some 
others can just be used for centralized infrastructure with superior performance. Nevertheless, we believe there is still room for 
improvement. 
 
Because the transmission route of each node is different, the uneven energy dissipation may cause the lifetime decrease of WSN 
node. Therefore the Low-Energy Adaptive Clustering Hierarchy (LEACH) routing protocol was proposed to reduce the energy 
dissipation for longer use of nodes (Heinzelman et al., 2000). LEACH is a cluster-based routing protocol with the major 
consideration of saving energy; therefore, nodes are not always in the active state. Furthermore, LEACH protocol was initially 
designed for static nodes. In general, static nodes are easier to handle but mobile nodes play well than static nodes for many new 
applications. Hence, in this paper, we propose the node replication detection method based on LEACH-Mobile-Enhanced 
(LEACH-ME) protocol introduced in Kumar et al. (2008). The main purpose is to balance the energy consumption and detection 
rate. We believe quite a few particular applications are tolerant of some sacrifices of power consumption in return for higher 
detection rates. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Previous Solutions for Replication Attack 
In the beginning, most of node replication detection methods relied on the Base Station (BS) to execute the centralized detection 
algorithms. Each node sends identification information, mainly the location claim or a list of neighboring members, to the BS for 
investigation. Then BS checks the received information and decides if there is a replication node. If the attacking situation 
happens, then BS floods the warning message all over the network to revoke that node. However, this mechanism may have the 
following disadvantages: 
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1. If the BS can’t work properly, then this type of methods totally fails 
2. The communication cost of centralized detection is really heavy 
3. BS may become the bottleneck of whole infrastructure 
 
To overcome the shortcomings of centralized detection, some scholars proposed local detection. They used voting mechanism to 
verify if a node is duplicated within a neighborhood (Chan et al., 2003; Eschenauer & Gligor, 2002; Newsome et al., 2004). This 
mechanism does not need BS but fails to detect clones that are far away from each other. And the communication cost of this 
mechanism is also very high, since n floodings happen in the network in each iteration where n is the number of nodes in the 
WSN. 
 
The Detection of Node Replication Attack for Static Nodes 
In Parno et al. (2005), they proposed two protocol that could use symmetric-key cryptography to recognize clone nodes 
effectively rather than asymmetric-key cryptography. First one is the Randomized Multicast (RM) protocol. This protocol 
chooses witness randomly. Due to the large number of nodes in WSNs, it is difficult for malicious one to guess which node is the 
witness. When a node announces its location, its neighbor will forward the location claim to the witness. If a witness receives an 
ID with different location claims, this witness will flood warning message all over the network to revoke that ID. Parno et al. 
(2005) also proposed another protocol named as Line-Selected Multicast (LSM) that further lowers the communication cost. 
After a node announces its location claim, its neighbor forwards the location claim to the randomly chosen witness. However, the 
location claim will be stored in each node’s buffer along the forwarding path. And the replication node should be found at the 
intersection of two lines as demonstrated in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1: Replication node is detected in the intersection of two lines for LSM algorithm (Parno et al., 2005) 
 
Znaidi et al. (2009) proposed an algorithm for detecting node replication attack in hierarchical structure WSN. Bloom filter is 
used in this mechanism for reducing the communication cost. This algorithm has an advantage that the length of the filter is 
steady but it may increase the false positive rate (FPR). 
 
Naruephiphat et al. (2012) provided Area-Based Clustering Detection (ABCD) method which combines the advantages of 
centralized approach and clustering protocol. At the beginning, center node is chosen based on the maximum number of 
neighboring nodes. Then the area around the center node is separated to several sub-areas. Nodes are evenly allocated in these 
sub-areas and one node should be selected as witness. Each node ID and location claim must be forwarded to neighbors and then 
a witness but this information must pass the center node. Therefore the center node can detect replication node with two different 
location claim but the same ID. 
 
Cheng et al. (2015) proposed a node replication detection algorithm with an improved LEACH (NI-LEACH) protocol to reduce 
the energy dissipation of nodes. They used a set of monitor nodes to observe the processes of data transmission in the cluster to 
check whether the data packet is tampered. The judgment algorithm is based on energy and covered range and NI-LEACH 
protocol calculates an optimal number of clusters and provides a new equation to calculate the threshold value for cluster head 
probability. 
 
The Detection of Node Replication Attack for Mobile Nodes 
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Yu et al. (2013) proposed two algorithms, Extremely Efficient Detection (XED) and Efficient Distributed Detection (EDD), for 
detecting clone nodes in mobile WSN. The strength of these two methods is due to the localized detection, network-wide 
synchronization avoidance and network-wide revocation avoidance. For XED, two mobile nodes exchange a random number 
when they encounter each other first time. Then these two node can verify each other when they meet again. However, XED 
cannot protect collusion of two nodes. EDD can be used for avoiding collusion by having counters in each node to count how 
many times they meet each other. A threshold for these counters will be set for replication attack warning. 
 
Another solution for mobile replication nodes detection in WSNs was proposed by Lee (2009). In this algorithm, any selected 
node can initiate the review round by broadcasting )(tR . )(tR  is a random number generated at time t . Any node α receives 
this number at time )(αT  and this receiving time should be different for different node with very huge probability. This 
information with ID will be forwarded to the randomly chosen witness with probability λP  by neighbors and the witness is 
responsible for replication node revocation. 
 
PROPOSED DESIGN 
To deal with the issues emphasized before, we design a node replication detection approach for mobile MSN operating on the 
LEACH-ME routing protocol and it is partially similar to the one proposed in Lee (2009). However, our proposed method 
delivers different authentication information and is working on different routing protocol. We also divide detection phase into 
four steps. The notations used in the detection algorithm are listed in the following Table 1. 
 
Table 1: The notations used in the detection algorithm 
Notations Meanings 
lC  Cluster l  
lCH  Cluster head of cluster l  
sID  ID of node s  
)(tR  Random number generated by sink at time t 
)( lCHT  Timestamp of lCH  receiving detection request packet from sink 
ll  Member list of cluster l  
lm  Mapping list for cluster head of cluster l recording ID-timestamp pair >< )(, yx CHTID  
fi  
)( sIDH                           
A fixed interval for next detection cycle 
A hash-function-based algorithm 
 
The first step: the random number is broadcasted by sink 
Detection phase is initiated by sink node in the beginning of one detection interval at time t . In general, it is often deployed 
around the center of WSN and is also easy to reach all of the nodes. At first, a random number )(tR  is generated by sink node 
at time t  and then it uses broadcasting method to send detection request packet with )(tR  to all other cluster heads in the WSN 
as shown in Figure 2. 
C lu s te r  H e a d
M e m b e r  N o d e
S in k
C lu s te r
R e p lic a tio n
N o d e
B ro a d c a s t R ( t) G a te w a y
 
Figure 2: Broadcast of )(tR  from sink node to cluster nodes 
 
The second step: is broadcasting member list. 
As a cluster head iCH  receives the detection request packet, then iCH  must decide which other cluster head jCH  should be 
multi-casted with the verification packet that includes its member list il , attached )( iCHT  and sID  of cluster head iCH . 
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The destination cluster head jCH  is decided by each node in the member list il  using a well-designed hash-function-based 
algorithm )( sIDH  which is similar to the one proposed in Lee (2009). Each node should only map into one destination cluster 
head. However, for the purpose of reducing communication cost, we should design the mapping algorithm with rather narrow 
range which only selects several destination cluster heads (two or three are better). This is another major different consideration 
between ours and the algorithm proposed in Lee (2009). 
 
The third step: destination cluster head verifies all IDs in the list and timestamp in the received packet 
When the cluster head jCH  receives the verification packet from iCH , jCH  should check if the IDs in the member list il  
conflict with any ID in the ID-timestamp pair :jm  >< )(, yx CHTID  as shown in Figure 3. If any confliction occurs, then 
jump to step four. If no confliction occurs, then jCH  inserts il  and  )( iCHT  into jm . After verification is done, jCH  
continues to wait for new verification packets. 
C lu s te r  H e a d
M e m b e r  N o d e
S in k
C lu s te r
R e p lic a tio n
N o d e
G a te w a y
C H i C H i tra n s m it ID i ,  l i  a n d  T (C H i)  to  
o th e r  c lu s te r  h e a d  th ro u g h  g a te w a y .
 
Figure 3  jCH  receives the verification packet and checks 
 
The fourth step:  cluster head broadcasts the replication node 
When jCH  finds any duplicate ID, then jCH  broadcasts to other cluster heads to insert this malicious ID in the ban list and 
also notify all the member nodes as shown in Figure 4. This node will not be included within the information interchange 
network any more. After this revocation job is done, return to step 3 to continue. 
C lu s te r  H e a d
M e m b e r  N o d e
S in k
C lu s te r
R e p lic a tio n
N o d e
G a te w a y
C H j
C H j  n o t i c e s  
r e p l i c a t i o n  n o d e  
a n d  b r o a d c a s t  
o th e r  c lu s te r  h e a d s  
to  b a n  i ts  ID . 
 
Figure 4: jCH  broadcasts to other cluster heads after detecting replication node 
 
Sink node will start a new round of replication node detection again after a period of time fi  passes, that is, will broadcast 
)( fitR +  to initiate next round. 
 
SIMULATION RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Simulation Setup 
We used Castalia framework as our simulation environment to evaluate energy dissipation, communication overhead and 
detection rates for this proposed method. Castalia is known as a famous framework for simulating WSNs and used in Boulis 
(2007). It is based on the popular simulator Omnet++. Omnet++ is coded in C++. Castalia has the complete radio modules of 
WSN and is equipped with the convenient functions for data analysis and data collection such as CastalieResult and CastaliaPlot. 
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Actually Castalia version 3.3 and Omnet++ version 4.6 were adopted and all the simulation parameters were set as the values 
demonstrated in Table 2. 
Table 2: The module used and the simulation parameters 
Simulation Parameters Values 
Number of nodes 
Simulation Time 
400 - 1000 
50 sec 
Field 500m * 500m 
Speed 2m / sec 
Detection Interval 15 seconds 
elecE  50 Nano Joule / bit 
elecε  100 Pico Joule / bit / 2m  
Repeat times Each simulation repeats 100 times 
Probability of being selected as Cluster Head 5 % 
Cluster Head Rotation Interval 4 sec 
TDMA slot length 0.2 sec 
Radio Module CC2420 
Mobility Module Random Waypoint 
 
All WSN nodes except the sink were deployed randomly and uniformly in the 500 m * 500 m square field. We set all nodes 
except the sink node with mobility speed 2m/sec. Totally 27 replication nodes with 3 different IDs were inserted in the field for 
each simulation. 
 
Results and Discussion 
The following figures demonstrate the simulation results of our approach and the detection algorithm proposed in Znaidi et al. 
(2009) which is somewhat revised by us based on LEACH-ME protocol for the purpose of comparison. Our detection approach 
is denoted as method 1 and method 2 represents the other compared approach. 
 
Communication Overhead 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Comparison of communication overhead 
 
From Figure 5, we can observe that the communication overhead of method 1 is a little bit better than method 2. However, the 
difference is not that significant. Furthermore, the communication cost of both methods increase exponentially with the number 
of nodes. 
 
Energy Dissipation 
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Figure 6: Comparison of energy dissipation 
 
From Figure 6, we notice that the energy dissipation of method 2 increases smoothly; however, method 1 increases quickly. We 
think the better performance of method 2 is due to the adoption of Bloom filter for detection but takes the correction rate of 
detection as sacrifice. Bloom filter is of fixed size, so the number of necessary bits for detection does not grow with the number 
of nodes. 
 
True Positive Rate (TPR) 
The detection approaches of method 1 and method 2 are all based on the exchange of the member list. Hence, we cannot observe 
the significant difference between these two as expected according to the results in Figure 7. We also find that the TPR grows as 
the number of nodes. We believe that the increase of total nodes is beneficial for transmitting packets across the field even though 
the larger number of nodes may cause the detection more difficult. 
 
 
Figure 7: Comparison of true positive rates for two detection approaches 
 
False Positive Rate (FPR) 
 
Figure 8: Comparison of false positive rate for two detection approaches 
 
It is noticed that there is a clear gap for FPR between method 1 and method 2 as demonstrated in Figure 8. We believe it is due to 
the difference between detection processes. For our method, the ID of replication node is put into ban list directly but, for method 
2, a cluster head needs to confirm the owner of received member list when it finds replication node ID in the Bloom filter. 
Because of the mobility of nodes, the confirming process of method 2 may increase the false positive rate. Moreover, these two 
methods have implicit but same trend as the number of nodes increases. It may be because two methods use the same original 
positions for each simulation even though these nodes were randomly deployed. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The main contribution of this paper is that we provide an alternative detection approach for node replication attack on 
LEACH-ME routing protocol. The primary consideration of the proposed approach is to use timestamp suggested in Lee (2009) 
and the member list as well but only their cluster heads are involved in the replication node detection process. Actually we 
believe this method can be revised slightly in the future to avoid misjudging a legal node as replication node while a node leaves 
one cluster but returns after just a while. Furthermore, the simulation results are provided to compare our approach with the one 
proposed in Znaidi et al. (2009) and demonstrate the useful scenarios of the proposed method. From these results, they enhance 
the original speculation that this approach is especially good for some particular applications which are tolerant of some 
sacrifices of power consumption in return for higher detection rates. 
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